Marc Estrin

HIROSHIMA, NOTRE AMOUR

July 30, 2005

On August 6th-9th, the world will observe the 60th anniversary of the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These activities will undoubtedly call forth responses asserting that the bombings ended the war, and saved an invasion of Japan and a million lives.

So much rides on the outcome, that discussing this is always a delicate matter. Still, at some point, even the most patriotic must face up to the many statements, memoirs, diaries and documents revealed over the past 60 years which tell a story quite different from the official one. Presidents, as we know, do lie, and their stories are often self-serving. Such has been the case with the “history” of Truman’s decision to drop the bomb, as anyone will easily discover by consulting the vast literature on the topic. Here is the gist of the matter.

It is certainly true that plans for an invasion were being worked on by each of the armed services. The model was for an initial, preliminary landing to be made on the island of Kyushu on November 1st, and for a full invasion to begin, should it still be necessary, in the spring of 1946. A prudent military plans thoroughly. But no order for such invasion had yet been given.

Although Truman repeatedly asserted that “The dropping of the bombs stopped the war, saving millions of lives,” there is little evidence that he believed an invasion would be called for. The question is not whether the atomic bombing ended the war (the war did end right afterwards), but whether from a military point of view, the use of the atomic bombs was NECESSARY to end the war without an invasion. The evidence indicates otherwise.

Shortly after the War, the official US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that “certainly prior to 31 December 1945 [i.e., before the general invasion], and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945 [i.e., before any preliminary landing], Japan would have surrendered—even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.”

Russia? By agreement among the Allies (remember Russia was our ally), the Soviet Union was scheduled to enter the Pacific war on August 15. Truman’s own estimation of the effects of this major new factor was clearly stated in his diary: “[Russia]’ll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about.” Why “fini”? Because Truman knew, as did most of his advisors, that Japan was already suing for peace, with only the status of the Emperor to be bargained over. The US had cracked Japanese codes, and was fully aware of international diplomatic traffic around this issue. Indeed, Secretary of War Stimson remarked at a cabinet meeting on August 10th, that “the Japanese had broadcast their offer of surrender through every country in the world.” (Diary), and our own intelligence services had provided voluminous data to back up this assertion.

Moreover, Truman’s own military and political advisers (with the exception of Secretary of State Byrnes, who had his own political agenda) were not of the opinion that the bombs were necessary to win the war or avoid invasion. Eisenhower, when informed of Truman’s plans to use the bombs voiced his “grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.”

Truman’s head of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral William Leahy, agreed: “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons….My own feeling is that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.” And even the aggressive General Curtis LeMay, subsequently head of the Strategic Air Command, thought that the atomic bomb “had nothing to do with the end of the war.” As early as April, LeMay had argued that the war could be ended by September or October without an invasion. And even Winston Churchill insisted, “It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled by the atomic bomb. Her defeat was certain before the first bomb fell.” (Triumph and Tragedy, p. 646.)

On the basis of much historical evidence, it is surely fair to say that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were NOT bombed in order to end the war and spare lives from an invasion. The end of the war was within reach, and an invasion, though planned for the following year, was no longer considered necessary by the end of June, 1945. The story to which so many Americans cling is just that—a story, easy to tell, and easy to accept. But it was not—and is not—the truth.

Why, finally, the bombs were dropped remains a matter of historical speculation, since the “official” reasons do not account for the facts. But with increasing access to documentary materials (see Gar Alperowitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb), the most likely hypothesis is that Truman wanted to use an atomic attack as a means of ending the Pacific war BEFORE Russia entered it, and thus position the US as the unchallenged post-war world leader. The Cold War was born even in the victory of the hot one.

The Nagasaki bomb, entirely unnecessary, since the “point” (if there was one) had already been made to the Japanese, was dropped because the complex design of that plutonium bomb had to be tested in combat conditions. Hiroshima had used a simple, untested, uranium design, but it was plutonium, available in ever-increasing quantities, that would have to be the basis for an American nuclear arsenal. The Manhattan Project’s plutonium effort had to be evaluated.

Such facts are disturbing, I know, and may seem insensitive to those whose lives and loyalties are tied to the official story. But they ARE the case, and arguments, if any, to justify the use of the bomb must be made in their context.